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Abstract: This paper surveys the literature that uses two-country models to
analyze monetary and fiscal policy issues faced in interdependent economies.
We discuss sources of structural interdependence that researchers typically
include in these models. We describe many of the types of policy interactions
that researchers have considered and summarize the key results that they
have obtained. Finally, we briefly explain the limitations of two-country
models and outline directions that this literature might usefully be extended.

1. Introduction
Bryant (1980) forcefully argued that macroeconomic policy
literature prior to the 1980s had paid insufficient attention to
international interdependence. As if in answer to Bryant’s call for
greater consideration of this issue, there has been an outpouring of
work applying two-country models to problems of exchange rate,
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monetary, and fiscal policy interdependence and to the possible gains
or losses of international coordination of macroeconomic policies. Twocountry models are a natural approach to the consideration of openeconomy policy issues.
In this paper we survey a wide range of the literature in which
such models are employed to examine many problems of monetary
and fiscal policy interdependence. We focus on theoretical work,
touching only tangentially on empirical applications (for more detail,
see Kenen, 1989; Onofri, 1990), and we address the following
questions. What issues can researchers usefully examine with twocountry models? What conclusions have researchers reached using
these models? How and why do these conclusions differ?
In the next section we outline the prototypical two-country
policy model. In Section 3 we discuss the types of structural linkages
that researchers commonly include in two-country models. In Section
4 we review the types of monetary and fiscal policy interactions
considered in the literature and summarize key results that
researchers have obtained to date. We discuss topics that we regard
as important areas for future research in Section 5.

2. The essential features of two-country models
We begin by outlining the essential elements of the two-country
policy problem. This problem was first explored systematically by
Hamada (1976). A useful starting point for any discussion of twocountry models, however, is the Oudiz and Sachs (1984) model of
generic policymakers in structurally identical nations. The policymakers
seek to minimize loss functions, L(M,M*) and L*(M*,M), where L and L*
denote domestic and foreign policy losses and M and M* give the values
of domestic and foreign policy instruments. Those who work with twocountry models often equate policy loss functions with social loss
functions, but doing so is fraught with conceptual problems. One is the
well-known debate over the existence of well-defined social welfare
functions. Irrespective of this issue, however, is the potential for a
policymaker to pursue self-interest rather than the social good, as
emphasized in the public choice literature. Nevertheless, both the
public-choice approach and the more recent partisan approach to
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analysis of policymaking indicate that policy loss functions, under
many circumstances, are proportional to social loss functions, if the
latter exist. Models of optimal policymaking typically rely on this result
as a basis for proposing functions such as L and L*.
As long as the derivatives of L and L* with respect to both M and
M* are nonzero, so that each policymaker’s policy instrument choice
affects the loss experienced by the other nation’s policymaker, there is
policy interdependence. For the purpose of illustration, suppose that
the policymakers’ losses are increasing with respect to their own
instrument choices but decreasing in the choice made by the other
policymaker, so that ∂L/∂M > 0,∂L/∂M* < 0, ∂L*/∂M* > 0, and ∂L*/∂M <
0. In addition, suppose that the loss functions are quadratic in the
instrument choices. Horowitz (1987) and Aizenman and Frenkel (1985)
provide justifications for viewing quadratic loss functions as reasonable
approximations to true measures of losses due to risk aversion or
forgone consumer and/or producer surplus. Nevertheless, the
overriding reason for the choice of a quadratic form throughout much
of the monetary and fiscal policy literature is the gain in expositional
simplicity, which is a particular virtue in the context of two-country
models.
With quadratic objectives, the policymakers’ indifference curves,
which are displayed in figure 1, are elliptical. The slope of the domestic
indifference curve is equal to –(∂L/∂M*)/(∂L/∂M) and the slope of the
foreign indifference curve is –(∂L*/∂M*)/(∂L*/∂M). The area of each
ellipse declines with higher values of the other country’s instrument,
yielding zero-loss bliss points B and B*.

Noncoordinated policymaking
Under Nash behavior, the domestic policymaker chooses M to
minimize its loss, taking M* as given, while the foreign policymaker
chooses M* to minimize its own loss, taking as predetermined. The
domestic first-order condition is ∂L/∂M = 0, which implies setting M at
a horizontal tangency to the domestic indifference curve, and the
foreign first-order condition is ∂L*/∂M* = 0, which entails setting M* at
a vertical tangency to the foreign indifference curve. For each
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policymaker, the set of all points at which the first-order condition
holds given the other policymaker’s instrument choice is its policy
reaction (best-response) function, denoted by R and R*, respectively.
The noncoordinated policy equilibrium is the crossing point, which has
been normalized at the origin. This is the point at which the reaction
functions cross, so that each policymaker’s actual instrument choice,
MN and M*N, is mutually consistent with the reaction of the other
policymaker.

Coordinating policymaking
Under policy coordination, each policymaker sets its instrument
to minimize a weighted sum of losses for both nations. Each
policymaker seeks to minimize the simple sum L + L*, so that
coordination gains are equally shared. For the domestic policymaker,
the first-order condition for the choice of M is, ∂L/∂M + ∂L*/∂M = 0, or
–(∂L/∂M)/(∂L*/∂M) = 1, and for the foreign policymaker, the firstorder condition for M* is, ∂L/∂M *+ ∂L*∂M = 0, or –(∂L*/∂M*)/( ∂L/∂M*)
= 1. These first-order conditions imply that the mutually consistent
instrument choices must satisfy the equality, –(∂L/∂M*)/(∂L/∂M) = –
(∂L*/∂M*)/( ∂L/∂M*). The left-hand side of this condition is the slope
of the domestic policymaker’s indifference curve, and the right-hand
side is the slope of the foreign policymaker’s indifference curve. Hence
there is a tangency of the indifference curves at a coordinated policy
equilibrium, point E in figure 1. The settings ME and M*E comprise the
Pareto-efficient set, illustrating Oudiz and Sachs’ key point: Other
things equal, policy coordination, if it can be implemented, is the
Pareto-efficient policy regime. Note that we follow Branson, Frenkel,
and Goldstein (1990) and Kenen (1989) by reserving the term
“coordination’’ to refer to mutual policymaker commitments to
concrete policy actions intended to attain either insular or common
objectives. Although policymakers can “cooperate’’ or “consult’’ by
exchanging information, such efforts entail no precommitment to use
shared information to avoid policy miscalculations or harmful beggarthy-neighbor effects.
As we discuss in Section 5, implementability is an important
issue. Suppose that the foreign policymaker feels bound to honor a
coordination agreement but the domestic policymaker does not. Then
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the domestic policymaker clearly has an incentive to renege, or
“cheat,’’ on its commitment to coordinated policymaking and choose
the instrument setting M∁, which yields a lower domestic loss while
saddling the foreign authority with a larger loss than anticipated. In a
multiperiod game the likely result would be a collapse of the
coordination agreement, which would yield a discounted stream of
losses to the domestic authority due to lost efficiencies in future
periods. This reputational consideration support the view that
coordination regimes can be implemented.

A leader-follower regime
A third behavioral mode for international policy-making is
Stackelberg behavior, in which one (say, the domestic) policymaker
leads and the other (foreign) policymaker follows in choice of policy
instruments. Under this behavioral approach, the domestic leader
chooses M taking into account the foreign policymaker’s reaction
function R*. Given this choice, denoted MS, the foreign follower’s choice
then is equal to M*S. This mode of preconditioned behavior is
preferable to purely noncoordinated policymaking but is inferior to the
policy-coordination regime for both authorities. For this reason, in
most contexts, particularly when it is assumed that the countries are
identical, it is difficult to provide a rationale for the existence of a
Stackelberg policy regime. As we discuss in Section 5, appeals to
structural or institutional features germane to a specific policy problem
typically are required.

A fixed exchange rate
Another type of scheme for policy interaction entails a mutual
agreement for one nation’s policymaker to fix its policy instrument
setting as a function of the instrument setting of the other
policymaker. The foreign policymaker, for instance, may M* fix as a
function of M and let the domestic policymaker choose M optimally. A
specific example of this approach to coordinated policymaking is a
fixed-exchange-rate regime, in which the foreign policymaker M*
varies as required to maintain an exchange-rate target, leaving the
domestic policymaker to determine the level and growth of M and,
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consequently, trend inflation for both nations. This is not the same as
the Stackelberg game, because the foreign policymaker in this
instance does not choose an optimal reaction, most notably in the face
of disturbances that may affect national losses asymmetrically. In the
presence of symmetric shocks and given the identical-nation
assumption, this type of fixed-exchange-rate regime yields the
coordination outcome illustrated in figure 1, as does an alternative
regime in which both nations coordinate variations in their money
stocks to maintain a fixed exchange rate.
The Oudiz-Sachs analysis is an application of theory of one-shot
games. Nevertheless, it illustrates the fundamental issues that arise in
two-country policy environments. All that is needed to extend this
approach to analyses of real-world policy problems is pinning down the
explicit structure of the policy objective functions and more formal
modeling of the international environment that the policymakers face.

3. Structural interdependence in two-country
models
When evaluating how to include potential sources of
interdependence in two-country models, a model-builder always faces
a tradeoff between realism and tractability, because solution problems
typically arise as a result of policy interdependence and resulting
feedback effects. A common feature of game-theoretic models of
strategic interaction among economic agents or policymakers is the
potential for multiple solutions. Of course, in a number of contexts
there may be multiple theoretical solutions, but only one economically
feasible solution to a two-country policy problem (see, for instance,
Bryson, Chen, and VanHoose, 1998). In other contexts, however, it
could be true that coordination failures and multiple solutions lie at the
heart of the policy problem (for instance, see Lane, 1990). As
discussed by Cooper and John (1988), the slopes and shapes of
players’ response (reaction) functions determine whether players’
choices are strategic complements or substitutes, thereby pinning
down the number of stable equilibria in game-theoretic models.
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Demand-side linkages
Within any two-country model of monetary and fiscal policy, the
nature of strategic interactions among policymakers depends largely
on the sources of structural interdependence that one builds into the
model. To consider structural interdependence from the demand side,
most researchers allow for a dependence of home output demand on
the real exchange rate. Many also include a role for financial-market
interdependence.
Uncovered interest parity (UIP) is a common assumption in
models that include a central role for interest rates, either in the
endogenous determination of other key variables or in the conduct of
monetary and/or fiscal policies. In the absence of perfect capital
mobility, balance-of-payments or wealth constraints, together with
bond-market equilibrium conditions, are needed to structurally link two
countries’ models economies (e.g., a two-country version of Benavie,
1983, or Canzoneri, 1982).

Supply-side linkages
In fact, real interest rates influence investment decisions, so
model-builders often must consider the fact that consumers or firms
care about consumer price indexes (CPIs). If the CPI is relevant for
consumption and investment decisions, however, it also should be
relevant for valuing workers’ real wages and input prices.
Consequently, another way to motivate structural interdependence in
a two-country framework is through real-exchange-rate effects in the
nations’ aggregate supply functions.
Purely from a modeling perspective, the drawback from
including supply-side inter-relationships is that they introduce a
number of additional complications. For instance, should wage setting
be atomistic, in that workers and firms are small enough that they
perceive that their individual choices cannot influence the CPI and,
consequently, incentives faced by policymakers? Or should wage
setting be treated as a centralized undertaking in which national trade
unions or governmentally managed coordination mechanisms establish
an aggregate wage bargaining process that helps to determine the CPI
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and policy incentives directly? Clearly, as Bruno and Sachs (1985) and
Calmfors and Driffill (1988) have documented, there are significant
differences among wage-setting institutions throughout the world, and
so the answer must depend on the countries under consideration.
Although little work has explored these issues, VanGompel (1994)
discusses the importance of pursuing such work, and Bryson et al.
(1986) have done initial work on supply-side interactions with
atomistic wage setters. Likewise, Jensen (1993) has explored
centralized wage setting in a two-country context.
With either demand- or supply-side linkages, the determination
of the real exchange rate pins down solutions for the nominal
exchange rate and nations’ CPIs. As a simplification, many authors
adopt the ex ante PPP assumption, which states that PPP holds on
average, though unexpected deviations can occur. This assumption
simplifies solutions of expectational models by tying down agents’
expectations via the anticipation that PPP will hold in equilibrium, while
permitting national policymakers to attempt to influence the terms of
trade ex ante.
The two-country framework has it roots in typical closedeconomy structures. The international linkage is how the closedeconomy model is “opened’’ to allow for international dimensions. The
linkage that opens the model determines the extent to which each
economy is affected by a foreign policy action, a policy reverberation
or policy spill-over, or the effectiveness of policy and practicality of
coordination under various monetary and exchange rate regimes. The
linkage, therefore, preconditions certain outcomes and eliminates
specific policy options. For example, in a typical theoretical model, UIP
renders fully sterilized exchange-rate intervention useless.

4. Modeling policy-interactions in two-country
models
In many practical contexts, including explicit linkages among
the policy procedures of the nations’ policymakers is appropriate. This
situation arises most often when the domestic policy instrument is
conditioned upon the exchange rate or upon a variable of the foreign
economy, such as the foreign interest rate or money stock. For
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instance, if responses of a foreign authority are not fully and
immediately sterilized by the domestic authority, then nations’ money
supplies are linearly dependent, which results in nonunique solutions
(Lane, 1990). This problem can be circumvented by assuming that
foreign intervention is not reflected in the domestic money rule. This
assumption requires that foreign intervention is immediately and fully
sterilized by the domestic authority (see Gros and Lane, 1992, Note
9), so that money supply rules are asymmetric and unique solutions
follow. Another approach, which Lane (1989) and Daniels (1997)
follow, is to specify the exchange rate regime of one economy and
then derive policy solutions for the other economy. This “ties down’’
the value of one authority’s instrument, allowing a unique solution for
the other authority’s instrument and permitting comparison of optimal
policy responses across regimes. Explicit policy linkages also arise
when a domestic policy instrument is conditioned on foreign variables.
Daniels and VanHoose (1995a) show that lagged foreign monetary
innovations can provide important intertemporal policy information for
the domestic authority. In this context, the policy linkage gives the
domestic authority an additional degree of freedom in its policy
decision.

Models of exchange-rate intervention
A common issue concerning direct policy interactions in twocountry models is the appropriate degree of exchange-rate
intervention when nations are structurally interdependent. Typically,
analyses of this issue are based on models that include policy rules for
the monetary authorities, with a floating-rate regime (no
interventions) lying at one extreme and a pure exchange-rate peg
lying at the other. Although Benavie (1983) considers only a single,
small open economy, this is a useful paper for understanding models
of optimal intervention policies, which have similar structures in most
two-country frameworks.
Good examples of two-country exchange-rate intervention
models are Canzoneri (1982), Lane (1989), and Gros and Lane (1992).
Canzoneri derives Poole (1970)-type results from a two-country
framework and generalizes to a three-country world. Lane considers
the common view that exchange-rate policy unpredictability should be
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minimized and reaches the interesting conclusion that one country
may desire to achieve an optimal degree of unpredictability in order to
influence the policy regime chosen by the other nation’s authority.
Gros and Lane provide a very lucid discussion of the strategic
interactions that arise when two nation’s monetary authorities
condition their policies on exchange-rate innovations. They show that
the nature of these strategic interactions depends on the sources of
disturbances, a point often neglected in models that focus solely on
strategic issues and abstract from stabilization goals that policymakers
typically pursue.

4.1. Models of monetary and exchange-rate
coordination
Whether nations could gain from coordinating their exchangerate and monetary policies has been a long-standing debate. Twocountry models have proven useful in evaluating the pros and cons of
policy coordination. Particularly influential models have been those
developed by Canzoneri-Henderson (1988) and Rogoff (1985a). The
structural frameworks proposed by these authors share three key
features. First, they include standard “IS’’ (income-expenditure
equilibrium) and “LM’’ (real-money-market clearing) relationships, in
which both the real exchange rate and foreign income affect desired
spending on home goods. Second, both have a supply-side structure in
which nominal wages are contracted in advance of labor- and goodsmarket clearing. Third, both models follow the bulk of the policy
literature by exploring policies aimed at stabilizing employment and
CPI inflation around target values.
Canzoneri and Henderson essentially imbed a structural
macroeconomic framework into the Oudiz-Sachs game-theoretic
analysis. Among other things, they consider how monetary policy
coordination could be welfare-improving for two nations that face
common disturbances, and they discuss potential mechanisms to
remove the incentive for a nation to “fink’’ on a commitment to a
policy agreement, an intertemporal version of their basic one-shot
policy game. One problem with the Canzoneri-Henderson (1988)
analysis, which carries over to Canzoneri-Henderson (1991), is that
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their analysis focuses primarily on optimal stabilization games
involving strategic interactions only among the policymakers. In these
games, private agents view policymaker commitments to either insular
or coordinated policymaking as credible. Furthermore, their
macroeconomic framework is highly stylized. In one respect, this is a
virtue. The stylized model is readily amenable to analysis of one-shot
games. This makes their framework a very useful pedagogical tool.
Nevertheless, the model does not readily lend itself to standard
aggregate demand-aggregate supply interpretations, and results from
the model are not always easily comparable to those that are more
broadly structured.
Rogoff (1985a) builds directly on the preceding macroeconomic
literature by constructing a two-country model based on a more
complete rational-expectations framework that, in contrast with
Canzoneri—Henderson (1988), includes a role for interest rates.
Although Rogoff’s model is somewhat more unwieldy, it, along with
Oudiz and Sachs, is very useful for learning how to construct twocountry models of monetary policy. In addition, Rogoff considers a
combined credibility-stabilization game by broadening the scope for
strategic interactions among both policymakers and private agents.
Rogoff’s paper makes one of the most fundamental points about policy
coordination: In the presence of time inconsistencies, monetary policy
coordination is not necessarily welfare improving. As emphasized by
Canzoneri and Henderson, coordination has stabilization benefits, but
Rogoff shows that noncoordinated policymaking tends to reduce the
extent of the discretionary inflation bias that exists when coordinating
monetary authorities internalize a desire to achieve short-run output
and employment expansions via unexpected inflation. Accounting for
time inconsistency problems thereby can overturn the basic OudizSachs result that coordination yields efficiency in two-country policy
games.
Much of the subsequent literature on monetary policy
coordination has applied the fundamental points of these pathbreaking
papers to examine coordination of policies by central banks in two
nations with separate currencies or by a supranational monetary
authority that determines the money stock within a two-country
monetary union. For instance, Canzoneri and Henderson (1991)
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extend their original analysis by contemplating asymmetric
disturbances. Lewis (1989) adapts Rogoff’s model to evaluate
circumstances that would induce occasional, but temporary, efforts to
coordinate policies.
Collins (1988) and Melitz (1988) are examples of early efforts to
apply concepts both from Canzoneri and Henderson and Rogoff to
issues concerning European Monetary Union (EMU). Considerable work
on this latter topic has followed; for more detailed overviews of EMU
issues, see Fratianni, von Hagen, and Waller (1992), De Grauwe
(1994), and Bayoumi, Eichengreen, and von Hagen (1997). Laskar
(1989), Currie, Levine, and Pearlman (1996), and Dolado, Griffiths,
and Padilla (1994) have extended the framework of Rogoff (1985b)
and evaluate how the appointment of conservative central bankers
might have contrasting welfare implications depending on asymmetries
of disturbances, the extent of coordination, and the nature of crosscountry monetary policy spillovers.
Most two-country-based analyses of monetary policy
coordination consider a world in which nations might coordinate
variations in their money stocks (or money growth rates).
Nevertheless, another type of international monetary coordination
setting that one might consider is a Bretton-Woods-type system in
which one, perhaps “dominant”, nation pins down the underlying
inflation rate for participating nations and coordinates this choice with
exchange-rate target setting(s) of the other member nation(s).
Canzoneri and Gray (1985) examine this version of the two-country
policy problem, which some have also argued may be applied to the
European Monetary System (EMS). (For differing interpretations on the
issue of German dominance in the EMS see Giavazzi and Giovannini,
1989; Fratianni and von Hagen, 1990 ; Hafer and Kutan, 1994;
Camen, Genberg and Salemi, 1991; Kutan, 1991.)
Under this perspective on a fixed-exchange-rate system, in
contrast to the Rogoff and Lewis approach in which monetary
authorities coordinate to fix the exchange rate, the exchange rate
itself is a strategic choice variable for one nation in a two-country
model, while the other nation chooses its money stock or growth rate.
van der Ploeg (1989), VanHoose (1992), and Bryson Chen, and
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VanHoose (1998) are examples of recent two-country interpretations
of such fixed-exchange-rate systems. von Hagen (1992) examines a
version of this approach in which one country delegates complete
monetary policy responsibility to the other nation’s central bank and
shows that in a repeated game this institutional structure could, in
principle, yield credibility gains for both nations’ authorities.

The instrument choice problem, nonstationarities, and
currency substitution
Considering money stocks/growth rates or exchange rates as
policy instruments simplifies the two-country policy problem but
obscures the fact that monetary policymakers typically use bank
reserves or money market interest rates as their policy instruments. In
the context of Poole (1970)-type analyses of the monetary instrument
choice problem, Turnovsky and d’Orey (1986, 1989), Turnovsky,
Basar, and d’Orey (1988), and Henderson and Zhu (1990) have
explored the nature of the strategic problem that monetary authorities
face. In particular, Henderson and Zhu consider a “battle-of-thesexes’’ game in which multiple equilibria arise from the interaction of
policymaker instrument-choice problems in which a policymaker’s
payoff depends on the other policymaker’s instrument choice rather
than its own. They show that the introduction of additive uncertainty
can reduce the number of equilibria and that under some
circumstances unique noncoordinated equilibria can entail Paretoinferior policy instrument choices. In addition, Daniels and VanHoose
(1995, 1998) have built on Goodfriend’s (1987) extension of the basic
Poole framework and Sephton’s (1989) small-open-economy
elaboration of Goodfriend’s model to show how international
interdependence can make base drift and price-level non-trendstationarities optimal central bank policies with and without policy
coordination.
Seigniorage, optimal settings for bank reserve requirements,
and currency substitution have recently received considerable
attention in the context of two-country models. Most models apply the
cash-flow definition to seigniorage (see Klein and Neumann, 1990;
Gros, 1993, for more on cash-flow versus opportunity-cost concepts of
seigniorage) to evaluate how optimal seigniorage would change in
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settings with coordinated monetary policies. Drazen (1989) highlighted
the importance of bank reserve requirements in relation to the
seigniorage issue, and Bacchetta and Caminal (1992) and Daniels and
VanHoose (1996) have explored this topic in two-country settings.
Until recently, most two-country models of monetary and fiscal
policy abstracted from complications introduced by consideration of
currency substitution. Canzoneri and Diba (1992, 1993) are important
exceptions. In particular, Canzoneri and Diba (1992) show how
currency substitution and seigniorage concerns interact to influence
the potential gains from monetary policy coordination. Proposed
benefits of competing currencies, they argue, are overstated when
fiscal authorities face tax collection costs.

Seigniorage and fiscal policies
Because seigniorage is a tax, it automatically relates monetary
and fiscal policy issues. Such issues have been of particular interest in
light of the Maastricht Treaty’s explicit fiscal constraints and of broader
discussions of achieving greater fiscal coordination and convergence in
Europe.
Several papers have used two-country models to evaluate the
fiscal policy implications of seigniorage with and without monetary
policy coordination and with and without a common currency. For
instance, Canzoneri and Rogers (1990) apply a cash-in-advance
approach to investigation the interplay between seigniorage and direct
taxes in a two-country setting. This leads them to conclude that the
ability to spread taxes across the two funding sources is a crucial
determinant, along with the magnitude of currency conversion costs,
of the desirability of a common currency. In addition, Sibert (1992,
1994) has imbedded an overlapping-generations framework to explore
the allocation of seigniorage shares between two nations with a
common central bank and the coordination of taxation and
government expenditures in a common-currency environment and
concludes that the gains from fiscal policy coordination are enhanced
in a monetary union. Jensen (1996) examines analogous issues in a
two-country extension of Alesina and Tabellini (1987) but which does
not include a time-inconsistency problem for policymakers vis à vis
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their private sectors. Sheen (1992) has conducted a simulation study
indicating that the case favoring fiscal policy coordination actually is
stronger than the case for monetary policy coordination.
Of course, one difficulty is that analyzing fiscal policy issues can
require attention to a number of problems, irrespective of the
seigniorage and other monetary and financial interactions. As Frenkel
and Razin (1987) have emphasized, failing to account for
intertemporal tradeoffs that fiscal authorities and private agents face
can lead to incomplete or even misguided results. In addition, Tanzi
(1991) has discussed key issues that proponents of fiscal coordination
must face, such as the inevitable asymmetries that create wedges
among the fiscal policy responses of national governments. Indeed,
Bryson (1994b) develops and conducts policy simulations within a twocountry framework and finds that fiscal coordination can increase the
extent of fiscal flexibility required for governments to deal with
asymmetric disturbances.
Levine and Brociner (1994) find that the case for fiscal
coordination is stronger when relative prices can change in a twogood, two—country setting, because without coordination,
governments have a greater incentive to improve their nations’ terms
of trade. Again the Levine-Brociner analysis abstracts from time
inconsistency issues that give rise to broader strategic interactions.
More generally, as Tabellini (1990) has shown, fiscal policy
coordination can internalize incentives that governments have to run
inflationary deficits, and so fiscal coordination potentially can, like
monetary coordination, be counterproductive.
The Maastricht Treaty places explicit limits on fiscal authorities
of nations that ultimately may choose to join the proposed EMU.
Bryson (1994a), like Jensen (1996) and Bryson, Jansen, and
VanHoose (1993), uses a two-country extension of the AlesinaTabellini (1987) model to show that fiscal policy coordination requires
a sufficient degree of fiscal-policy flexibility and thereby could be
hindered by such constraints. This buttresses analogous conclusions
that Masson and Melitz (1991) reach in a simulation study of fiscal
interactions among Germany, France, and the rest of the world.
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Some have argued, nevertheless, that a monetary union
promotes greater fiscal convergence even without formal constraints
on fiscal policy. Glick and Hutchison (1993) apply a two-country model
to evaluate the extent to which formation of a monetary union
constrains the discounted present values of government expenditures.
They find that although a monetary union tends to bring about longrun convergence in discounted spending flows, considerable crosscountry variability nevertheless can arise. Jensen (1996) concludes
that the case for fiscal coordination is strengthened by formation of a
monetary union.
Taking into account various combinations of potential channels
of interactions among monetary and fiscal authorities, however,
considerably muddies the waters concerning the desirability of either
monetary or fiscal policy coordination. Jensen reaches this conclusion
under the assumption that policymakers can honor commitments to
private agents. Bryson Jensen, and VanHoose (1993) examine
situations of committed or discretionary policymaking with respect to
private agents with either monetary coordination alone or combined
cross-coordination (but not within-country coordination) of both
monetary and fiscal policies. They do so in a model with no
disturbances and hence no stabilization concerns, yet they find that
the theoretical case for either monetary coordination alone or for
combined monetary and fiscal coordination is unclear.

5. Issues for further research
What more can we learn from two-country models of monetary
and fiscal policy? We conclude by evaluating this question.

Asymmetries
A key assumption in most two-country models is that nations
are symmetrically structured. There is an important advantage of
using this assumption, which is that it greatly simplifies the solution of
a two-country model while nonetheless permitting authors to make
key points about the likely effects of policy actions or regime changes.
An obvious and important drawback of the structural symmetry
assumption is that gains and losses in monetary or fiscal unions can
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vary based on a nation’s relative size (see, for instance, Cassella,
1992).
There are, of course, various ways that countries may be
asymmetric. As noted above, they may have divergent wage-setting
structures. As in Canzoneri-Rogers (1990), they may possess differing
fiscal structures and tax-collection technologies. They also may have
access to differing policy commitment technologies. Asymmetries can
also exist because of the size and leadership role of a particular nation.
For example, Germany’s monetary policy leadership position
represents an asymmetry in the EMS, in that the Bundesbank may
conduct independent monetary policy while other member nation’s
surrender policy autonomy (von Hagen, 1993). This view has come to
be known as the German Dominance Hypothesis.
The most common means of introducing asymmetries into twocountry models, however, is through consideration of asymmetric
disturbances (see Fratianni and von Hagen, 1990b; Canzoneri and
Henderson, 1991; Bryson, 1994). A typical type of asymmetric shock
examined in two-country models is one that entails a shift in demand
from one country to another. This is the easiest form of asymmetric
shock to consider because it involves analyzing shocks that have the
same absolute sizes.
It is arguable that we may have learned as much as we can
from symmetrically two-country frameworks. Furthermore, resolving
most issues concerning coordination of monetary, exchange-rate, or
fiscal policies realistically require considering asymmetries that
countries face. Researchers may need to begin sacrificing simplicity for
greater realism in two-country frameworks.

Implementability of coordination schemes
Most initial research on mechanisms for implementing
international policy coordination focused attention on the potential for
supranational institutions to promote both policy cooperation or
coordination. As Cooper (1985) points out, supranational institutions
can negotiate the “burden-sharing’’ of coordinated policy schemes,
reducing free-rider problems. This can be particularly important when
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there is a large difference between the size of nations. Third-party
organizations can also make possible the attainment of national goals
that are in direct conflict with each other. For example, the
International Monetary Fund can provide sufficient reserves to allow
two nations to enjoy payments surpluses at the same time.
Supranational organizations are particularly well-suited forums for
policymakers to share information and ideas about the structure of
individual economies, forecasts, objectives, and intended policy
actions. Hence, policy cooperation can reduce the “harm’’ of
noncoordinated regimes. Furthermore, supranational organizations can
provide a leadership role when policymakers of the leading nation find
it politically impossible or unwise to do so.
Finally, and perhaps most important, these third-party
organizations potentially can perform an important monitoring
function. To the extent that these institutions can observe and report
on the behavior of policymakers, supranational institutions can reduce
the potential for policymakers to “cheat’’ on coordination agreements
when the social and private gains from coordination do not coincide.
Asymmetries change the distribution of the gains from coordination
and can inhibit attempts to act collectively. Structural or goal-driven
asymmetries, therefore, raise the issue of side payments and benefits
from establishing third-party referees, such as supranational
institutions including the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank.
Supranational organizations are unlikely to be privy to all the
private information possessed by national policymakers, however. As
pointed out by Canzoneri and Gray (1985), policy processes are
complex and economic measurements can be ambiguous, making
cheating relatively easy in an international context. This has led many
researchers to focus attention on coordination schemes based on
highly visible coordination targets. von Hagen (1993) concludes that
because the exchange rate is a particularly visible target, a fixedexchange-rate regime can serve as a useful “surrogate’’ for
coordination.
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Policy timing issues
An important feature of any policy analysis is the timing of a
national authority’s policy choice relative to observations of
disturbances and the choices of other policymakers. If authorities must
act before they observe shocks, then there is little scope for
stabilization policies, aside from, say, choosing an optimal instrument
given knowledge of variances of shocks, as in Poole (1970). If
authorities can wait to determine optimal choices after shocks occur,
however, then they can affect the choices of private agents. This will
be so even if private agents cannot themselves observe the shocks,
since the agents recognize that authorities will partially offset
disturbances (see VanHoose and Waller, 1991).
A key implication of a game theoretic approach common to twocountry policy modeling is that the timing of players’ moves is a key
determinant of the behavioral interactions among players.
Consequently, the timing of policy decisions has a significant bearing
on the equilibrium outcomes that emerge in two-country policy games.
To this point, the literature has paid insufficient attention to this issue.

Three- and many-country models
In a global economy composed of more than 175 recognized
political entities, there are some obvious limitations to policy analyses
conducted via two-country models. As Canzoneri and Henderson
(1991, Chapter 3) demonstrate, even in the absence of time
inconsistency problems, policy coordination among two countries may
reduce their residents’ welfare when the nations have a third major
trading partner that is not part of the policy-coordination arrangement.
An earlier version of this same basic point is made by Canzoneri
(1982), who points out that a key issue in evaluating monetary unions
is how the formation of a union between two nations exposes one
member of the union to interactions between the other member and a
third nation.
Canzoneri and Henderson make this point in the context of a
stylized framework in which two identical economies in combination
are identical in size and structure to a third economy. In contrast,
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Laufer and Sundararajan (1994) consider a three-nation model with a
“mixed-exchange-rate’’ regime in which two nations maintain a fixed
exchange rate vis à vis one another but permit the exchange rate vis à
vis the third nation to float. They find that the use of such a mixedexchange-rate regime reduces the extent to which shocks originating
in the third nation can influence outcomes in the nations with the
fixed-exchange-rate agreement.
Several authors have considered settings in which the “world
economy’’ described by their models includes a large number of
nations. For instance, Aizenman (1992) and von Hagen and Süppel
(1994) have developed many-country frameworks to analyze policy
problems faced by member states of a monetary union. Aizenman
focuses on the inflation tax competition within a common-currency
union, while von Hagen and Süppel apply their model to an analysis of
the appropriate degree of policymaking centralization within such a
union. Kehoe (1987) has provided a many-country model of fiscal
policy interactions, which he uses to illustrate how increasing the
number of countries pushes equilibrium fiscal policy choices further
from coordinated outcomes. Sorensen (1996) applies a monopolistic
competition framework to help explain why a subset of countries that
produce similar goods and desire to embark on fiscal expansions might
wish to coordinate their fiscal policies.
In all of these multicountry models, the authors obtain tractable
solutions by assuming that countries are small and identically
structured, although they allow for country-specific disturbances. One
possible direction for future work would be to try to develop manycountry models that permit some degree of “lumpiness’’ in the
distribution of country sizes, perhaps by considering a world composed
of groups of nations that follow into one of two basic size categories:
small or large. Such an approach likely would lend itself to tractability
while enabling a model to focus on issues arising from differences in
countries’ relative sizes.

Dynamics and informational issues
Most two-country policy models are static, one-period
frameworks. Of the papers discussed above, Kehoe (1987) is a notable
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exception. Likewise, real-business-cycle frameworks such as the one
proposed by Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1994) contain dynamic
elements, although most of these latter models have not yet proved
readily amenable to policy analysis.
One simple way to take into account intertemporal aspects of
monetary and fiscal policy issues would be to follow Bini-Smaghi and
Del Giovane (1996) by considering multiperiod problems in
policymaking and coordination. These authors provide a simple twoperiod version of a standard two-country framework to evaluate policy
criteria that might contribute to convergence among nations that join
the European monetary union.
Another useful extension of two-country models would be to
consider the potential importance of imperfect information. Frankel
and Rockett (1988), for instance, have provided a static framework for
evaluating a specific type of policy uncertainty—policymaker
uncertainty about the true economic model—and its potential
implications for the desirability of policy coordination. They show that
such uncertainty can significantly reduce the likelihood of sizable ex
post gains from policy coordination. Ghosh and Masson (1991) show
that this result hinges on the assumption that policymakers are so
dogmatic that they give no credence to the possibility that the models
used by their counterparts might be correct. Once individual
policymakers allow for the possibility that the model used by another
policymaker may be the correct model and evaluate this possibility
based on observations of macroeconomic variables, coordinated
policymaking dominates alternative uncoordinated regimes.
To our knowledge, only two papers have considered both
dynamic and informational issues in the context of a two-country
policy model. Neck and Dockner (1995) evaluate a noncooperative
open-loop setting, in which policymakers choose their strategies given
information only about initial states, thereby committing themselves to
particular strategies. They contrast this setting with one characterized
by a noncooperative feedback equilibrium that assumes policy-makers
choose their strategies given information about the current state. This
is analogous to the standard, time-consistent discretionary policy
commonly analyzed in a static framework. In addition, Neck and
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Dockner consider a cooperative equilibrium in their dynamic twocountry policy game, which, because they assume that private-sector
agents do not act strategically with respect to policymakers, yields
Pareto efficiency. van Aarle, Bovenberg, and Raith (1997) examine
both open-loop strategies and feedback strategies that do not presume
precommitment in their analysis of a dynamic game between two
national fiscal authorities and a central bank in a two-country
monetary union. They conclude that feedback strategies, which
arguably are a more realistic depiction of dynamic behavior of
discretionary policymakers, lead to slower debt stabilization by fiscal
authorities within a two-country monetary union.
These recent contributions point toward at least one route that
two-country policy models might be taken, which is to evaluate
equilibria arising from dynamic policy games with alternative
information sets. Another potentially fruitful avenue, which (to our
knowledge) has not yet been investigated, would be to examine twocountry policy interactions in environments with asymmetric
information. Any nation’s policymakers realistically possess private
information that is not available to policymakers in another nation or
to their own nation’s private sector (see, for instance, Cukierman,
1992). Considering this type of policy environment could yield
important implications about the credibility of international policy
coordination, which is the key determinant of the potential for any
welfare gains to arise from such arrangements.
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